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1ABSTRACT
This manuscript analyzes the e⁄ect of binary ecolabeling on the strategic compe-
tition of Cournot duopolists in environmental technology and the output market.
Under binary labeling, ￿rms￿abatement technologies are not directly observable
by consumers but are certi￿ed if they satisfy preset ecological standards. Given
this asymmetry, I set up the regulator￿ s problem as one of choosing a technology
standard, or "cuto⁄," in emissions per unit of output, below which all abatement
e¢ ciency levels are certi￿ed. The regulatory authority faces a trade-o⁄in choos-
ing the socially optimal cuto⁄: The regulator would like to raise the standard to
reduce emissions but needs to lower it in order to induce technology adoption.
There are three important ￿ndings: (1) ecolabeling is the second-best instrument
in that choosing the optimal cuto⁄ per se can never achieve the ￿rst-best out-
come; (2) e¢ ciency loss in terms of the di⁄erence between the ￿rst-best and the
second-best total surpluses may or may not be large, depending on the extent
of the certi￿cation barriers; and (3) setting too high or too low a standard is
not only ine¢ cient, but can also lead to an increase in total emissions relative
to the status quo. Thus, setting the technology cuto⁄ optimally is of crucial
importance.
Keywords: ecolabeling, emissions, product di⁄erentiation, technology adoption
JEL codes: D43, L13, Q53, Q58
2I. Introduction
This paper has a dual goal. It is to investigate the e⁄ects of binary environmental labeling
(or "ecolabeling") on the interaction of ￿rms and consumers and to examine optimal rules
for setting a technology standard for ecolabeling given this interaction.
A binary label simply indicates that the labeled brand is produced in an environmen-
tally friendly manner. Thus, under binary labeling, the ￿rms￿abatement technologies are
not directly observable by consumers, but can be certi￿ed if they satisfy preset ecological
standards. In fact, many ecolabeling initiatives worldwide are binary. Canada￿ s Eco-logo,
Germany￿ s Blue Angel, Japan￿ s Eco-Mark, the Nordic Council￿ s Nordic Swan, and the US￿ s
Green Seal are well-known examples of binary ecolabeling.2 Because information on envi-
ronmental attributes is often complex and is hard to communicate, binary labeling has been
promoted as a preferred labeling mode.
Under binary labeling, ￿rms￿supply-side responses are often sensitive to technology stan-
dards set force by certi￿cation programs. For example, a series of surveys by Japan￿ s Eco-
Mark O¢ ce (JEO) indicate that there is a large variation in the ecolabeled brands￿market
shares even within a similar product category (e.g. toilet paper and tissue paper) (Table
1). The JEO￿ s labeling standard for tissue papers and toilet papers are essentially the same
￿ the percentage content of secondary or recycled papers. However, tissue papers require
2"The ISO de￿nes three types of ecolabels. Type I labels compare products with others in the same
category, awarding labels to those that are environmentally preferable throughout their whole life cycle. The
criteria are set by an independent body and monitored through a certi￿cation or auditing process... Type
II labels are environmental claims made about goods by their manufacturers, importers or distributors.
They are not independently veri￿ed, do not use predetermined and accepted criteria for reference, and are
arguably the least informative of the three types of environmental labels. A label claiming that a product is
￿ biodegradable￿without de￿ning this term is a Type II label. Type III labels provide a menu of a product￿ s
environmental impacts throughout its life cycle. These labels are similar to nutrition labels on food products
that detail fat, sugar or vitamin content. Unlike Type I labels, these labels do not judge products. That
task is left to consumers. Critics question whether the average consumer has the time and knowledge to
determine whether, for example, emissions of sulphur are more hazardous than those of cadmium" (UNEP,
2006, p.3). Up to date, many ecolabeling programs worldwide use either Type I or Type II. Germany￿ s Blue
Angel, Canada￿ s Eco-logo, the US￿ s Green Seal and Japan￿ s Ecomark are well-known examples of Type I
ecolabeling programs. This manuscript￿ s analyses apply to these Type I programs. Type II ecolabels are also
ubiquitous. Type III ecolabels exist, but are rare. For example, the U.S. Scienti￿c Certi￿cation Systems has
prepared an eco-pro￿le that can be applied to any product category.
3more subtle and softer textures than toilet papers do. Thus, it is more costly to produce
tissue papers than toilet papers that satisfy the same standard while maintaining the other
quality attributes discernible to consumers. Thus, if consumer preferences for environmental
attributes are the same with tissue papers and toilet papers, then the di⁄erence in produc-
tion and investment costs to meet the standard can explain the observed di⁄erence in market
shares.3
Table 1.
Market Shares of Eco-Marked Products in Sales to Consumers












With these factors in mind, I construct a model of Cournot duopolists in which con-
sumer demand is generated by binary labeling and heterogenous altruistic preferences. The
duopolists play a two-stage simultaneous-move game: In stage 1, ￿rms simultaneously choose
abatement technology levels and whether to certify in the ￿rst stage; and in stage 2, they play
a Cournot game of quantity competition with the corresponding demand system. Given this
3It is certainly plausible that consumers have slightly di⁄erent motivations for purchasing durables and
non-durables, which may in turn a⁄ect their preferences for ecolabeled durables and non-durables. For
example, O￿ Brien and Teisl (2001) ￿nd that consumers are more inclined to purchase environmentally labeled
brands if the product was a frequently purchased item, because this would allow them to make a greater
environmental impact. However, there seems to be no apparent reason why consumers would have di⁄erent
preferences for ecolabeled toilet papers and ecolabeled tissue papers.
4game structure, I set up the regulator￿ s problem (in stage 0) as one of choosing a voluntary
technology standard, or"cuto⁄," in emissions per unit of output, below which all abatement
e¢ ciency levels are certi￿ed for environmental labeling. Set up this way, it is immediate to
observe a trade-o⁄ in setting the socially optimal cuto⁄: The regulator would like to raise
the standard to reduce total emissions from the industry but need to lower it in order to
induce ￿rms￿technology adoption. Moreover, because the duopolists￿supply responses are
determined in part by their cost functions as well as consumer demand, total emissions from
the industry is not necessarily decreasing in the equilibrium number of certifying ￿rms.
This regulator￿ s instrument is imperfect in a number of important regards, however.
First, because labeling is only binary, it can only o⁄er an incomplete signal to consumers.
Second, because consumers are heterogeneous in altruistic interests, consumers can interact
with one another in an important way in the product market. Labeling can cause altruistic
consumers to purchase ecolabeled goods, which increases (decreases) the price of ecolabeled
(non-labeled) goods. However, sel￿sh or environmentally unaware consumers do not mind
buying non-labeled goods and bene￿t from the low price of non-labeled goods. The equilib-
rium prices are, therefore, likely to depend on the distribution of altruism among consumers.
Third, ￿rms compete strategically both in the output market and in environmental tech-
nology adoption given the consumer demand and the cuto⁄ chosen by the regulator. Thus,
imperfect competition among the ￿rms erodes away the e⁄ectiveness of environmental label-
ing. Because of these market distortions, the regulator cannot, in choosing the optimal level
of ecolabeling standard, maximize social net bene￿t in the ￿rst-best manner. Thus, binary
ecolabeling is second-best in nature.
The magnitude of e¢ ciency loss in terms of the di⁄erence between the ￿rst-best and the
second-best total surpluses depends crucially on the primitive parameters of the economy
such as the dispersion of altruism and the ￿xed cost of technology adoption. Since no
clear-cut analytical results are feasible, I construct a numerical example to demonstrate how
changing these parameters a⁄ects e¢ ciency loss. For example, the regulator can attain the
5total surplus su¢ ciently close to the ￿rst-best level when the ￿xed-cost parameter is small
whereas when it is high, the regulator can set the standard only at the level that is too loose
compared to the ￿rst-best level. The result is robust to perturbations of the other model
parameters.
Although my analyses primarily deal with the case of identical technology endowments, I
also brie￿ y analyze the heterogenous case. When ￿rms are endowed with di⁄erent abatement
e¢ ciency levels, the regulatory authority may opt for a discriminatory standard in favor
of ￿rms with more environmentally friendly technology. This case is important, because
proponents of ecolabeling initiatives often appear to presume that such a discriminatory
labeling can automatically reduce emissions from the industry. In contrast to the popular
view, I show formally that choosing a discriminatory ecolabeling standard at an inappropriate
level can lead to an increase in total emissions relative to the status quo. Intuitively, this
happens because the consumers may respond to ecolabeling in such a way that the demand
for the labeled good increases too much to the extent that outweighs the bene￿t of the
demand shift (from the non-labeled good to the labeled good). Thus, the paper calls upon a
question into the current ecolabeling practice, which often relies on an engineering approach
to determine the technology standards with no or little economic consideration.
This paper complements two large strands of literature. First, my model is related
to, but is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from, previous theoretical studies on ecolabeling, many of
which typically use a vertical product di⁄erentiation model (Cremer & Thisse, 1994; Arora
and Gangopadhyay, 1995; Bansal & Gangopadhyay, 2003; Amacher et al., 2004; Engel,
2004; Conrad, 2005; Lombardini-Piipinen, 2005). Vertical di⁄erentiation o⁄ers an obvious
advantage because it captures the underlying trade-o⁄ ￿rms face: competition among ￿rms
may be less intense if they o⁄er products that are less substitutable, but they may reap more
pro￿ts by selecting an undi⁄erentiated product for which demand is strong (Hotelling, 1929;
Mazzeo, 2002). However, a vertical di⁄erentiation model assumes perfect information, and
therefore, its applicability may be limited in the context of binary labeling and on the ground
6that detailed information on environmental attributes is much harder to communicate than
other product qualities that are readily observable by consumers.4 My analysis is appropriate
for many ecolabeled products of interest, such as o¢ ce papers, construction woods, sanitary
goods, stationary goods, staple agricultural commodities, and electricity, which have a thin
margin for quality competition. Thus, the paper complements a growing literature on ￿rms￿
environmental quality competition.
Second, earlier research e⁄orts have focused on showing whether or not ecolabeling has
a positive in￿ uence on consumer behavior. Along this line, a number of empirical studies
based on stated preferences or experiments have concluded that many consumers would
select ecolabeled products over standard ones both at equal and at di⁄erent prices (Blend
and Ravenswaay, 1999; Teisl et al., 1999; Wessells et al., 1999; Loureiro et al., 2001; Moon
et al., 2002; Conner, 2002; Sergienko and Nemudrova, 2002; Wechel and Wachenheim, 2002;
Johnson et al., 2002). Studies on actual in-store demand followed and found the positive
demand as well as the large willingness to pay (WTP) for ecolabeled products (Teisl et
al., 2002; Bjorner et al., 2004; Hiscox and Smyth, 2005). However, this paper suggests
that the positive consumer demand for ecolabeled goods does not necessarily translate into
the positive e⁄ects of ecolabeling and the failure to account for the (potential) interactions
between ￿rms and consumers could result in biased policy implications.
Though this paper focused on emissions, its main contention can readily generalize to
environmental externalities from unsustainable use of renewable resources such as forest and
marine resources. For example, sustainability concept adopted by the Forest Stewardship
Council or the Marine Stewardship Council may be used as a measure of negative externality
per unit of output. The trade-o⁄s the labeling authority faces are essentially the same as
4In recent years, information on environmental performace has been publicized via various public disclo-
sure programs such as the U.S. Toxics Release Inventory and EPA￿ s 33/50 program. Firms are increasingly
cautious about their reputation as environmentally friendly entities. However, prior empirical studies indi-
cate that it is questionable to claim that consumers can and do relate such detailed information to the exact
environmental impact of each product and take it into purchasing considerations. A ￿eld-experiment study
by Hiscox and Smyth (2005), for example, seems to suggest that it is the power of labeling rather than the
detailed information that derives consumers￿purchasing decisions.
7those in the case of emissions. If the standard is set too loose, the increased consumption of
the labeled products may outweigh the bene￿t of the sustainable harvesting practice. If the
standard is too high, however, producers may withdraw from certi￿cation and no signi￿cant
impacts may result. Thus, an optimal standard must strike an appropriate balance.
II. The Model
A. Firms
Consider a market for a homogenous (i.e. physically identical) good with two identical
producers. The good can be produced using di⁄erent production processes or inputs. The
abatement e¢ ciency ! of each production technology is measured in terms of emissions per
unit of output, so that the total emissions are given by E = !1X1+!2X2, where Xj denotes
the quantity produced by ￿rm j. Two identical ￿rms, endowed with initial abatement e¢ -
ciency ￿ !, play a two-stage game. In the ￿rst stage ("Stage 1"), ￿rms simultaneously decide
to certify or not certify their products for environmental labeling, and choose a new abate-
ment e¢ ciency !. Because ! is measured in emissions per unit of output, a higher ! implies
lower abatement e¢ ciency. If they decide to certify, they must pay the investment cost k
and face the new marginal cost c, both of which depend on the new abatement e¢ ciency !.5
In the second stage ("Stage 2"), ￿rms play a Cournot game of quantity competition with the
corresponding demand system depending on the number of certifying ￿rms.6 The investment
cost depends on the distance between the initial and the new abatement e¢ ciency levels. I
assume throughout that the capital and other costs required to attain ! > ￿ ! (i.e. the costs
5Investment cost here includes all tangible and intangible ￿xed costs of entry, such as certi￿cation fees,
legal lisencing fees, documentation costs as well as investments in physical or human capitals.
6We could employ Bertrand competition instead. However, with Bertrand competition, when both ￿rms
certify or do not certify, x1 and x2 become literally identical under binary labeling. Thus, equilibrium prices
will be p = c(!1) = c(!2). When only one ￿rm certi￿es, two products become incomplete substitutes, so that
we can solve for demand functions: xj = Dj(p1;p2). In this case, it is well known that Cournot competition
is dual to Bertrand competition in that the Cournot reaction functions, equilibrium strategies, and pro￿ts
can be derived from the Bertrand ones, though Cournot competition is typically more monopolistic than
Betrand competition in that Cournot quantities (prices) are lower (higher) than in Bertrand competition
(Singh and Vives, 1984).
8of ￿ divesting￿ ) is su¢ ciently high relative to the cost-saving gains from it, so that no ￿rm
would ever ￿nd it optimal to choose ! > ￿ !. I take ￿ ! to be the ￿xed primitive parameters
of the model. Therefore, under these conditions, we only need to deal with the compact set
of possible abatement technologies, ￿ = [0; ￿ !], so we write k (!; ￿ !) = k (!). Furthermore, I
impose the following regularity assumptions:
A1. c(!) is twice-continuously di⁄erentiable with c0 < 0;c00 ￿ 0 and c(0) = ￿.
A2. k (!) is twice-continuously di⁄erentiable with k0 < 0;k00 ￿ 0, k (￿ !) = 0 and k (0) =
K > 0.
As will be explained below, ￿ > 0 is a preference (and demand) parameter and, therefore, A1
implies that it is economically not viable for ￿rms to produce the good with zero emissions.
B. Consumers
The economy consists of a continuum of identical consumers indexed with i. Under bi-
nary labeling, consumers do not observe ￿rms￿abatement e¢ ciencies !￿ s directly, but their
products can be certi￿ed by a third-party program if ! satis￿es a predetermined technol-
ogy standard. Each consumer has quasi-linear preferences Ui (xi;E) = ￿xi ￿ x2
i=2 ￿ E2=2,
which are separable in the numeraire good. If !￿ s and everybody￿ s actions were perfectly
observable, consumers could calculate environmental damages from their own consumption
E =
R
!1x1i + !2x2i di. However, in a large economy like ours, consumers know their con-
tribution to environmental damages is non-measurable, and therefore, will completely free
ride on others and will not buy ecolabeled products.
To allow for a purchasing incentive for the ecolabeled good, I assume that consumers have
genuine altruistic interests (Kennett, 1988; Johansson, 1997).7 By genuine altruism, we mean
7Johansson (1997) classi￿es altruism into four broad categories: (a) pure altruism, (b) paternalistic altru-
ism, (c) impure altruism, and (d) genuine or semi-Kantian altruism.
9that individuals "care for other individuals, through their behavior, without deriving any util-
ity from it" (Johansson, 1997). Moreover, in our context, consumers do not know the precise
impacts of their behavior on others. Thus, I assume that each consumer acts as if collective
action, given everyone acts the same as hers, will a⁄ect everyone￿ s utility. Therefore, the con-
sumer acts as if she maximizes the adjusted net bene￿t U (x1i + x2i;E)￿v (￿i)￿p1x1i￿p2x2i,
where v (￿i) = ￿i(
P
j ￿jxji)2=2 and ￿i 2 (0;1) is an altruistic parameter.8 ￿j is an indicator
function, which equals one if j is non-labeled and zero otherwise. Thus, a higher ￿i means
that i is more altruistic. Furthermore, I assume there is a known distribution of altruism




￿ d￿(￿) = E￿i.
The assumption of genuine altruism is partly made for analytical tractability as well as
for consistency with binary labeling. As shown in Johansson (1997), in a large economy, pure
altruism in the sense of Becker (e.g. 1974) imposes restrictive assumptions on the (relative)
size of an indirect utility e⁄ect through others￿utilities: As the population size grows, the
indirect e⁄ect must decrease proportionally. On the other hand, impure altruism in the sense
of Andreoni (e.g. 1989, 1990) could be used in our context. However, a demerit of impure
altruism is that the total surplus depends not only on the consumption and environmental
damages, but also on the utility gains by each consumer through impure altruism. This
makes calculation of the total surplus intractable.9
Given this setup and assuming an interior economy, we obtain an individual demand
given by the following system: If both ￿rms certify, x￿
1 (￿) + x￿
2 (￿) = ￿ ￿ p; If only ￿rm
1 certi￿es,10 x￿
1 (￿) = ￿ ￿ p1 ￿ (p1 ￿ p2)=￿ and x￿
2 (￿) = (p1 ￿ p2)=￿; If none certi￿es,
8Except the altruism term v, this is a standard treatment in the literature (see, for example, Qiu (1997),
Singh and Vives (1984), Spence (1976) and Vives (1985)). Note that the usual utility maximization problem,
maxfu(x1;x2;z) j p1x1 + p2x2 + z ￿ mg, is equivalent to maximizing the net bene￿t function, U(x1;x2) ￿
p1x1 ￿ p2x2, if u is quasilinear in z, i.e., u(x1;x2;z) = U(x1;x2) + z.
9In this manuscript, I use the terms "sel￿sh" and "altruistic" to describe an individual, respectively with
a low and a high ￿. These words, however, need not be interpreted literally. Readers may interpret, for
example, "sel￿sh" to mean individuals who are not environmentally aware. The wording choice was made
so it is consistent with the notion of genuine altruism. All that is required for the results in this manuscript
is that when we calculate total surplus, we do not need to deal with the intractable integration over the
distribution of allocations and preferences.
10If ￿ is su¢ ciently close to zero, x￿
2 will be bounded by the budget constraint: m=p2. By interiority
assumption, however, I will ignore this case, as the relative price p1 ￿ p2 will adjust and become su¢ ciently
10x￿
1 (￿) + x￿
2 (￿) = (￿ ￿ p)=(1 + ￿). This system yields sensible comparative statics. When
both ￿rms certify, ￿ plays no role and two goods are identical. When only one ￿rm certi￿es
(i.e. both labeled and non-labeled goods are available), @x￿
1=@￿ > 0;@x￿
1=@p1 < 0; and
@x￿
1=@p2 > 0 and @x￿
2=@￿ < 0;@x￿
2=@p1 > 0; and @x￿
2=@p2 < 0 as long as p1 > p2. If
p1 = p2 = p, then x￿
1 = ￿ ￿ p and x￿
2 = 0 for all ￿ 2 (0;1). When no labeled good is
available, consumers know that the goods available are not produced in an environmentally
friendly manner, so that an increase in ￿ decreases the demand for these goods.
The average (inverse) demand, corresponding to each case, is given by the following: if
both ￿rms certify,
P1 = P2 = ￿ ￿ (X1 + X2); (1)
if only ￿rm 1 certi￿es,
P1 = ￿ ￿ (X1 + X2); P2 = ￿ ￿ X1 ￿ (1 + 1=￿)X2; (2)
where ￿ = E [1=￿] 2 (1;1); if none certi￿es,
P1 = P2 = ￿ ￿ (1=￿)(X1 + X2); (3)
where ￿ = E [1=(1 + ￿)] 2 (1=2;1).
The parameters ￿ and ￿ have an intuitive appeal. ￿ may be considered a measure of
￿ dispersion￿of altruism in that a mean-preserving spread (MPS) of the distribution increases
the value of ￿ (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970), and therefore, it increases, via (2), the average
demand for non-certi￿ed goods. When both labeled and non-labeled goods are produced,
each ￿rm needs to consider not only the e⁄ects of its production decisions on its own price
but also on its competitor￿ s, because the demand for the labeled good is determined in part
by the price of the non-labeled good and vice versa. Furthermore, this interaction between
close to zero if a su¢ ciently large number of consumers have such ￿.
11two market segments is intermediated by the distribution of altruism in such a way that
an increase in dispersion increases (decreases) the non-certifying (certifying) ￿rm￿ s ability
to raise its own price. Intuitively, this happens because MPS moves the population mass
of both the sel￿sh and the altruistic in such a way that preserves the expected value of the
distribution. However, sel￿sh consumers with ￿ close to zero take advantage of the lower
price of x2 and consume more of x2. Thus, its overall impacts favor the non-labeled product.
On the other hand, ￿ is a measure of the ￿ market size￿ . Because 1=(1 + ￿) is a convex
function, MPS again raises the value of ￿. The increase in ￿ increases the demand at a given
price p. Thus, the di⁄erence (1 ￿ ￿) in the average demand between (1) and (3) may be
viewed as the size of the positive labeling impact on consumer demand: It becomes large
when consumers are largely altruistic while it becomes smaller as the mass of the sel￿sh
population increases.
C. Regulator
At the beginning of this two-stage game, a third-party ecolabeling program sets a tech-
nology cuto⁄point, denoted ￿, on [0; ￿ !]. I assume away measurement errors occurring during
the certi￿cation process or the stochastic nature of investment outcomes. Hence, all ! ￿ ￿
will be labeled as environmentally friendly. Because the labeling is only binary, consumers
cannot identify ￿rms￿abatement technologies !. Under these assumptions, it is immediate
that pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms will choose ! = ￿, if they decide to certify given the cuto⁄ ￿.
In this paper, I only solve for pure strategies. As will be made clear in the later analysis,
the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria of the two-stage game above depend crucially on ￿.
Thus, it is natural to think of the regulator￿ s problem in setting a standard for ￿. However,
in setting the standard, the regulator faces a natural tension between its own and the ￿rms￿
objectives. Ideally, the regulator would like to lower the cuto⁄, so that the certi￿ed ￿rms
would attain the higher level of environmental technology. However, if the cuto⁄ is too
tight, the ￿rms may refrain from investing in environmental technology. Moreover, because
12the duopolists￿supply responses are determined in part by their cost functions as well as
consumer demand, it is not necessarily true that the total emissions from the industry is
lower when two ￿rms certify than when one ￿rm or none certi￿es. The regulator, therefore,
chooses an optimal cuto⁄ ￿
s, which maximizes the (average) net surplus:11










￿ TS (￿ !) ￿ F; (4)
where x￿ (￿) = (x￿
1 (￿);x￿
2 (￿)) is a vector of equilibrium quantities given ￿, Cj j￿ s total
production cost, TS (￿ !) the status-quo total surplus when no ￿rm certi￿es, and F the ￿xed
cost of establishing a coherent labeling program. A few things must be clari￿ed. First,
the altruistic term v is ignored, because by de￿nition of genuine altruism it does not a⁄ect
consumer surplus. Second, I ignore the ￿xed cost k in the calculation of net surplus, because
I treat k to be a variable part of the model primitives and examine the impacts of the changes
in k on the maximal surplus and because the inclusion of k in (4) does not meaningfully a⁄ect
our main results. Lastly, I assume the following regularity condition to hold throughout the
paper:
A3. Model primitives ￿ = (￿; ￿ !;c;k;￿) are such that the maximum possible level of net total
surplus is increasing in the number of certifying ￿rms.
The condition essentially says that the underlying structure of the economy favors ecola-
beling: Higher welfare levels can be potentially achieved if more ￿rms certify. This condition
e⁄ectively precludes the possibility of a trivial boundary solution ￿
s = ￿ !. I emphasize, how-
ever, that the condition does not necessarily imply the social optimum always attains when
both ￿rms certify. In fact, as will be discussed later, it is sometimes optimal to induce only
one certifying ￿rm even under A3.
11We are concerned only with the ￿ average￿net surplus, because in the model, all quantities are expressed
in averages only.
13III. The First-Best Outcome
As a benchmark, let us ￿rst examine the ￿rst-best outcome of the economy. Because
￿rms have identical technologies and consumers have identical preferences, we can impose a
symmetric solution to the social planner￿ s problem. Imposing X1 = X2 = X, !1 = !2 = !
and xji = xj = x for all i 2 (0;1), we obtain Xj =
R
x di = x, E =
R
!1x1i+!2x2i di = 2!x,
and
R
U(x1i + x2i;E) di =
R
U(2x;2!x) di = U(2x;2!x). Given these relationships, we can
derive the following:
Lemma 1. The ￿rst-best interior emissions standard !FB (in per unit of output) maximizes






1 + !2 : (5)
Proof : The ￿rst-best outcome of the economy must maximize the total surplus given by
TS =
Z
U(x1i + x2i;E) di ￿
X
j=1;2 c(!j)xj
= U(2x;2!x) ￿ 2c(!)x
= 2(￿ ￿ c(!))x ￿ 2x
2 ￿ 2(!x)
2 ;
where the second line follows from the symmetry and the last line follows by substituting
the explicit expression for U. The social planner would choose x and ! that maximize this
expression. Note that this function is concave in each of the arguments ! and x, but is not
globally concave in (!;x). Thus, I will require the ￿rst-best output x to trace out an interior







Substituting this back to the original total surplus function above, we obtain the desired
14expression.12 Q:E:D:
Equation (6) says that the competitive output level, (￿ ￿ c(!))=2, must be decreased
to re￿ ect the negative externality by the factor of 1=(1 + !2). This ￿rst-best outcome can
be achieved, for example, by directly controlling x and ! or by combining an ad valorem
subsidy on output price and an emissions tax equal to the marginal environmental damage.
Note that the regulator (or ecolabeling authority) in our setup does not have direct access
to this net bene￿t function, because he can only choose the ecolabeling standard to a⁄ect
consumers￿and ￿rms￿behaviors. As will be shown later, the regulator can set the socially
optimal technology standard ￿
s only at the second-best level. In this paper, therefore, I
reserve the term "￿rst-best" for the fully e¢ cient outcome that maximizes (5).
III. Characterization of Two-Stage Game
A. The Second Stage Quantity Competition
Given the technology choice !j, each ￿rm chooses production quantity xj, which solves:
max Pj (x1;x2)xj ￿ c(!j)xj ￿ k (!j):
As discussed earlier, the inverse demand Pj changes according to the number of eco-certi￿ed
￿rms. In each of the three generic cases, there exists a unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Substituting (1), (2) or (3) for each case, taking the ￿rst-order condition, and manipulating,
we obtain the equilibrium quantities (~ x1; ~ x2) and pro￿ts (￿1;￿2) (Table 2). Note that in the
table, I use the fact that certifying ￿rms must choose ! = ￿ and non-certifying ￿rms ! = ￿ !
with k (￿ !) = 0. Furthermore, note that A(￿) = ￿￿c(￿) ￿ 0 and B (￿) = c(￿)￿c(￿ !) ￿ 0 for
all ￿ 2 [0; ￿ !] by A1. However, there is no a priori reason why the pro￿ts net of investment
12Note that W becomes a downward-sloping convex function of ! if c is not su¢ ciently convex, in which
case the solution becomes trivial ￿ !FB = 0. That is, it is optimal to require ￿rms to produce output with
zero emissions. If, on the other hand, c is su¢ ciently convex, W will be concave in ! on a relevant section,
so that at least one of the roots satisfying the ￿rst-order condition will be the solution.
15costs are nonnegative in Case (1) or (2). Thus, I assume that the ￿rm ceases to produce at ￿,
at which the equilibrium net pro￿t becomes nonpositive.13 The ￿rm￿ s equilibrium quantity
and pro￿t are constant only when both ￿rm 1 and ￿rm 2 do not eco-certify. Even when
￿rm 1 does not certify, its equilibrium quantity and pro￿t are functions of ￿ as long as its
opponent certi￿es, because the equilibrium quantities depend on the marginal production
costs of both ￿rms.
Table 2.








































Note: A(￿) = ￿ ￿ c(￿);B(￿) = c(￿) ￿ c(￿ !); and D = ￿ ￿ c(￿ !).
B. The First Stage Certi￿cation Decisions
Because any entering ￿rm chooses !j = ￿, the duopolists simply engage in a two-by-
two simultaneous-move game, with fcertify (ec), not certify (nc)g being the set of possible
actions. Let us de￿ne ￿I
1 (￿) ￿ ￿1(ec;ec), ￿II
1 (￿) ￿ ￿1(nc;ec), ￿III
1 (￿) ￿ ￿1(ec;nc), and
￿IV
1 (￿) ￿ ￿1(nc;nc). With ￿ !1 = ￿ !1 = ￿ !, the game reduces to a symmetric one with the
following payo⁄ matrix for ￿rm 1 at the ￿rst stage:
13To be more precise, ￿rm 1￿ s equilibrium quantity in III may not be positive under some region. We can










Fact 1. Let n￿ be the equilibrium number of ￿rms in the ecolabeled segment. Then we have



















Multiple equilibria arise when the last case occurs. Moreover, if one of the inequality





1 , the corresponding equilibria will be n￿ = 1 and n￿ = 2. The structure
of the game depends on the cuto⁄ ￿, because the set of SPNE outcomes depends only on
combinations of ordered pairs: ￿I
1 (￿) Q ￿II
1 (￿) and ￿III
1 (￿) Q ￿IV
1 (￿ !). Therefore, the
characterization of the two-stage game is equivalent to characterizing how these ordered
pairs change as a function of ￿.
Let us de￿ne
L
nm (￿) = ￿
n





nm (￿) = 0g:
for n;m = 1;::;4, which correspond to cases I;:::;IV . As will become apparent, though only
the signs of L12 and L34 determine the SPNE of this game, we need information on the signs
of L13, L14, and L24 to describe how L12 and L34 change signs as a function of ￿.
From Table 2, it is immediate that ￿I
1 is increasing in ￿ with its ￿rst derivative d￿I
1=d￿ =
17￿(2=9)A(￿)c0 ￿ k0 > 0 for ￿ with ￿I
1 (￿) > 0; ￿II
1 strictly decreasing with d￿II
1 =d￿ =
2a(￿)[A(￿) + 2B (￿)]c0 < 0; ￿III
1 increasing with d￿III
1 =d￿ = ￿4a(￿)[(1 + 2=￿)A(￿) ￿
B (￿)]c0 ￿ k0 for ￿ with ￿III
1 (￿) > 0; and d￿IV
1 =d￿ = 0, where a(￿) = (1+1=￿)=(3 + 4=￿)
2.
This is intuitively trivial: The advantage of certi￿cation decreases as its technology stan-
dard becomes more stringent, which requires higher investment and production costs; The
tightening of the standard is advantageous to the non-certifying ￿rm because it increases the
￿rm￿ s ability to exploit its lower production costs. In general, these pro￿t functions need
not be concave in ￿.14 By the monotonicity of the second-stage pro￿t functions, we also see
that ￿I
1 (￿) ￿ ￿II
1 (￿) for all ￿ ￿ ￿
12 and ￿III
1 (￿) ￿ ￿IV
1 (￿) for all ￿ ￿ ￿
34. In Lemma 2 in
Appendix, I show that these two important ￿ thresholds￿￿
34 and ￿
12 exist and are in deed
unique. These relationships, combined with Fact 1, establish the following:




12, n￿ = 0 for ￿ ￿ ￿
34, n￿ = 1 for ￿
34 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿




34, n￿ = 0 or 2 for ￿ ￿ ￿
12 and n￿ = 2 for ￿ ￿ ￿
34.
A corollary to this fact is that a unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium wherein only
one ￿rm certi￿es attains if and only if ￿
34 < ￿
12 and ￿ 2 (￿
34;￿
12). Figure 1 illustrates
graphically how the structure of the ￿rst-stage game is determined as a function of ￿ for the




From a regulator￿ s point of view, the case with ￿
34 < ￿
12 is more important. As will
be discussed in detail, neither total output nor total emissions from an equilibrium with
n￿ = 1 is necessarily higher than those from an equilibrium with n￿ = 2. As a result, net
total surplus, calculated as in (4), will not necessarily be lower when n￿ = 1 than when
14Under A1 and A2, ￿II
1 is surely convex whereas ￿I
1 and ￿III
1 are concave if c is su¢ ciently convex.
18n￿ = 2. If ￿
12 < ￿
34 and, therefore, n￿ is either 0 or 2, then the regulator￿ s problem simpli￿es
signi￿cantly. Because the net total surplus is negative (i.e. ￿F) when n￿ = 0, assuming
that the total surplus is su¢ ciently large when n￿ = 2 at least in some non-empty segment
on ￿, it is su¢ cient to pick ￿
s that maximizes the total surplus given n￿ = 2. Moreover, my
numerical simulations appear to show that the set of primitives that support the case with
￿
12 ￿ ￿
34 is limited. For these reasons, I focus on the case with ￿
34 < ￿
12 in the subsequent
analyses.15
One interesting characteristic of our model setup is that it can generate a continuum of
cuto⁄ values that support the Prisoner￿ s Dilemma (PD) outcome. In previous theoretical
studies, it is often presumed, implicitly or explicitly, that ￿rms invest in environmental
technologies and enter green markets if such markets o⁄er pro￿table investment opportunities
(e.g. Cremer & Thisse, 1994; Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995; Swallow & Sedjo, 2000; Sedjo
& Swallow, 2002; Bansal & Gangopadhyay, 2003; Amacher et al., 2004; Engel, 2004; Conrad,
2005; Lombardini-Piipinen, 2005). However, it appears equally plausible that cases exist
where ￿rms must invest and enter the green markets because such strategy is a strictly
dominant strategy even though they know that such a strategy will strictly decrease their
pro￿ts. Figure 2 exhibits two numerical examples, one in which the PD outcome attains
and the other in which it does not. Using Lemmas 3 and 4 in Appendix, we can establish
su¢ cient conditions for the existence of the PD outcome.
Lemma 5. For a given set of primitives ￿ = (￿; ￿ !;c;￿) with L24 (￿ !;￿) < 0, there exists an





, each ￿ on which supports a SPNE
wherein both ￿rms certify even though such an outcome is strictly Pareto-dominated by the
status-quo outcome.
[Figure 2]
15A su¢ cient condition for ￿
34 < ￿
12 and it proof are available from the author upon request.
19Of course, the net welfare e⁄ects may be still positive even when the PD outcome arises.
Thus, the regulator need not to avoid such an outcome necessarily. Nonetheless, there are at
least three reasons why the regulator may need to care about this outcome. First, ecolabeling
has been promoted as a voluntary mechanism. However, the existence of the PD outcome
implies that ￿rms may be forced to adopt environmental technologies that strictly reduce
their pro￿ts. This may interfere with the spirit of the voluntary labeling scheme.16 Second,
the PD outcome may not be sustainable if the duopolists have an opportunity to collude
(say, play an in￿nitely repeated version of this game). Finally, the net social surplus as
calculated in (4) does not include investment costs, and thus, may overestimate the welfare
e⁄ects when this outcome attains.
IV. Socially Optimal Technology Standard
The regulatory authority￿ s objective is to set a technology standard ￿
s that maximizes
the net surplus (4) given the primitives ￿. However, in so doing, the authority faces two
dilemmas. First, as shown in the previous section, n￿ is an increasing function of ￿: i.e. if
the technology standard is tight, less ￿rms would ￿nd it pro￿table to enter the ecolabeled
segment. Second, because ￿ a⁄ects marginal production costs, total output and total emis-
sions are (non-linear) functions of ￿ for each ￿xed n￿. Because the net total surplus depends








> > > > <
> > > > :
￿F if ￿ ￿ ￿
34
TS (￿;1) ￿ TS (￿ !;0) ￿ F if ￿
34 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
12
TS (￿;2) ￿ TS (￿ !;0) ￿ F if ￿
12 ￿ ￿
: (7)
where TS (￿;n) is the total surplus net of environmental damages as a function of ￿ when
16In the mechanism design literature, some authors de￿ne "voluntary participation" constraints as no
decrease in participants￿private pro￿ts relative to their status-quo or no-participation pro￿ts (e.g. Smith
and Shogren, 2002).
20the number of certifying ￿rms is n. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, multiple equilibria can
arise at ￿ = ￿
12 or ￿
34. For analytical tractability, I simply assume that the regulator can
choose the equilibrium that attains the largest net surplus.17
Let us ￿rst show the main result of this section that binary ecolabeling per se can never
achieve the ￿rst-best e¢ cient outcome. The result obtains because binary labeling is an
imperfect policy instrument on a number of important accounts. First, binary labeling gives
an incomplete signal to consumers. Second, ecolabeling gives rise to a number of economic
interactions between and across ￿rms. The interaction among consumers via equilibrium
pricing distorts (average) consumer demand for the labeled and non-labeled goods. Fur-
thermore, ￿rms interact strategically both in the output market and in technology adoption.
These factors jointly limit the regulator￿ s ability to achieve the ￿rst-best outcome. As a
result, the "socially optimal" standard is second-best from the outset.
Proposition 1. Under binary ecolabeling, the ￿rst-best e¢ cient outcome can never be










Therefore, the socially optimal standard is second-best in nature.
Proof : First, the maximal ￿
s of (7) maximizes the RHS of the above inequality. Second,
￿
s must maximize TS (￿;n) for some n 2 f0;1;2g. Furthermore, by A3, we have max￿




W (￿) > max￿ TS (￿;2). This holds trivially if W (￿) > TS (￿;2) for all ￿.








where ! is simply replaced by ￿ because both ! and ￿ are in the same unit. To compare
17Of course, we can eliminate multiple equilibria by imposing additional equilibrium-selection criteria such
as the elimination of weakly dominated equilibria. However, I decide not to do so because it will only
complicate our discussion without providing real policy implications.
21W (￿) and TS (￿;2), we can simply compare the two multiplicative factors on (￿ ￿ c(￿))
2.





















2) 2 [0;1) for ￿
2 2 [0;1) and ￿
2(1 ￿ ￿
2) ￿ 0 for all ￿
2 ￿ 1, a contradiction.
Q:E:D:
As the proof of the proposition suggests, the ￿rst-best outcome cannot be achieved even
without the ￿xed-cost barriers to certi￿cation. In practice, the magnitude of e¢ ciency loss
depends crucially on the structure of the economy, particularly the distribution of altruism
￿ and the ￿xed-cost function k. Since no clear-cut analytical results are feasible as to the
magnitude of ine¢ ciency, I will use a concrete numerical example to "demonstrate" the
following facts:
Fact 3. Non-trivial cases exist in which the regulator can only set the optimal technology
standard for ecolabeling at a level much looser than the ￿rst-best level and, therefore, e¢ -
ciency loss, de￿ned as the di⁄erence between the ￿rst-best total surplus and the maximum
attainable level of total surplus via ecolabeling, is quite large.
In the numerical example, I assume identical consumers with ￿i = ￿, c(!) = ￿exp(￿d!),
and k (!) = K(! ￿ ￿ !)2, where ￿ = 10;￿ = 0:5;d = 3:5, ￿ ! = 1 and K = 10 or 70. We can
verify that these parametric assumptions satisfy A1-A3, and the relative size k=c is in a
reasonable range. Figure 3-(a) and 3-(b) illustrate how the ￿rst-best and the second-best
(ecolabeling) outcomes di⁄er, respectively, with K = 10 and K = 70. First, note that there
are e¢ ciency losses in both cases. More importantly, e¢ ciency loss is small in Figure 3-(a)
whereas it is quite large in Figure 3-(b). This contrast pins down the dilemma that the
22ecolabeling authority faces.
[Figure 3]
The increase in investment costs decreases the ￿rms￿pro￿t margins and undermines the
regulator￿ s ability to set a tight technology standard. As a result, the economically viable
region for certi￿cation (i.e. [￿
34;￿
12) [ [￿
12; ￿ !]) is smaller in Figure 3-(b) than in Figure
3-(a). When K = 70, the authority would wish to choose ^ ￿, which attains the maximum
of TS (￿;2) on ￿. This is the maximum level of (net) total surplus that could have been
attained if both ￿rms had participated in certi￿cation. However, at such a cuto⁄ level, no
￿rm would actually certify because ￿rms act strategically. If the authority indeed chooses ^ ￿,
it obtains a negative social cost ￿F (because TS (￿ !;0) could have been attained without the
labeling e⁄ort). This point must be taken seriously, as many ecolabeling initiatives worldwide
often set technology standards based on engineering or scienti￿c criteria, with no or little
consideration of economic incentives. Similar results hold for changes in the distribution of
altruism. An increase in the mass of the sel￿sh would decrease an average demand for the
labeled good, and therefore, it will prevent the regulator from raising the standard.
More formally, we can establish the following, the proof of which can be found in Ap-
pendix.
Proposition 2. (i) For a given set of primitives ￿ = (￿; ￿ !;c;￿), let k0 and k1 be investment
cost functions, which satisfy A2 and k0 (!) < k1 (!) for all ! 2 ￿. Then we have ￿
12 (￿;k0) ￿
￿
12 (￿;k1) and ￿
34 (￿;k0) ￿ ￿
34 (￿;k1). (ii) For a given set of primitives ￿ = (￿; ￿ !;c;k), let
￿0 and ￿1 be two cumulative distribution functions on (0;1) such that ￿ (￿0) < ￿ (￿1) and
￿ (￿0) < ￿ (￿1). Then we have ￿
12 (￿;￿0) < ￿
12 (￿;￿1) and ￿
34 (￿;￿0) < ￿
34 (￿;￿1).
This result has a real policy implication. If the labeling authority wishes to induce high
levels of ￿rms￿abatement technology adoption, the authority may opt for policies to lower
entry costs associated with certi￿cation such as subsidies on certi￿cation fees or abatement
23investments. Furthermore, if the authority observes either the consumer demand is highly
heterogeneous or the ￿xed costs of meeting the standard are too high, it needs to compromise
on the loose standard. For example, Fischer et al. (2005) cites the estimates of the costs of
forest certi￿cation in the U.S., which vary but can be as low as $0.55 per acre for preparation.
For those engaged in illegal or unsustainable logging in developing countries, however, the
costs of meeting the certi￿cation standard will be prohibitively high. This may explain why
developing countries currently account for only 8% of the total certi￿ed area (Fischer et al.,
2005), although, ironically, many forest certi￿cation programs were originally established to
tackle deforestation in these countries.
There is a caveat to the analyses presented above. There can be a "jump" in ￿
s in that,
as ￿ or k changes, the optimum ￿
s may jump from [￿
12; ￿ !] to [￿
34;￿
12]. This means that it
can be optimal to induce only one ￿rm into the ecolabeled market rather than two ￿rms.
This case happens even under A3, because the total surplus on the range of ￿ that supports
n￿ = 1 can be still higher than that on the range that supports n￿ = 2, for the following
three reasons. First, total output can be higher when n￿ = 1 than when n￿ = 2 because the
decrease in demand for a non-labeled good could be well o⁄set by the increase in demand for
a labeled good. Second, total emissions can be lower when n￿ = 1 than when n￿ = 2 because
the emission per unit of output (= the cuto⁄) that supports n￿ = 1 may be signi￿cantly
lower than that supports n￿ = 2. Third, the total production costs can be lower when n￿ = 1
than when n￿ = 2.18
V. Heterogeneous Technology Endowments
All analyses in the preceding sections can extend easily to the case with heterogenous
technology endowments. In general, there will be threshold cuto⁄s ￿
0 and ￿
00 such that n￿ = 0
on [0;￿
0], = 1 on [￿
0;￿
00], and = 2 on [￿
00; ￿ !] where ￿ ! = maxf￿ !1; ￿ !2g. An optimal standard
￿
s needs to be chosen so as to maximize the net total surplus, and thus, the regulatory
18I have con￿rmed this "jump" result with numerical examples similar to the one above.
24authority must consider how setting ￿
s will a⁄ect n￿. However, there are subtle di⁄erences
in the analysis when ￿rms are endowed with di⁄erent technology endowments.
A key di⁄erence is that the regulator can now choose a discriminatory standard such
that ￿ !1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ !2. Such a discriminatory policy may be often popular in political de-
bates, for several reasons. First, large corporations with advanced abatement technolo-
gies may lobby for the policy that favors their technologies. Second, ￿rms are generally
against the ￿ technology-inducing￿standard, which requires technologies that are not cur-
rently available or economically viable.19 Thus, the regulator may be constrained to choose
￿ ￿ minf￿ !1; ￿ !2g. An important question then is, how di⁄erent such a discriminatory policy
is from the technology-inducing standard. In this section, I focus on the impact of labeling
standard ￿ on total emissions rather than on (net) total surplus. This is because we know
from the outset that a constrained maximum subject to ￿ 2 [￿ !1; ￿ !2] is no greater than an
unconstrained maximum and that if the constraint is binding, such a discriminatory policy
will be ine¢ cient. I expect, therefore, that the policy evaluation is done in terms of second-
best criteria such as emissions reductions relative to the status quo. Moreover, there appears
to be a presumption among ecolabeling practitioners that discriminatory labeling would au-
tomatically decrease emissions. On the contrary, the analysis in this section suggests that
discriminatory labeling could increase emissions relative to the status quo.
Without loss of generality, I assume ￿ !1 < ￿ !2. Assume further that the cost of certi￿cation
except for technology investments is negligible. Under these assumptions, any ￿ 2 [￿ !1; ￿ !2]
would favor ￿rm 1 (advantageous ￿rm) because it can certify its product without additional
costs. Note, however, that even when ￿ !1 ￿ ￿, ￿rm 1 can also choose not to certify, in which
case consumers treat goods produced by ￿rm 1 as non-environmentally friendly because they
cannot directly observe ￿ !1. It is easy to show that when ￿ !1 ￿ ￿, it is a dominant strategy
19EPA often locks in technologies at the best available control technologies.
25for ￿rm 1 to certify. Furthermore, provided that ￿rm 1 certi￿es, ￿rm 2 certi￿es if and only if
￿
￿ + c(￿ !1) ￿ 2c(￿)
3 + 4=￿
￿2










The left-hand side of this inequality monotonically decreases as ￿ decreases whereas the
right-hand side is constant given the model primitives. Let ￿ be such that (8) holds with
equality. If ￿ > ￿ !1, there will be regions [￿ !1;￿] where n￿ = 1 and [￿; ￿ !2] where n￿ = 2.
Clearly, the number of ￿rms with e⁄ective technology adoption is n￿ ￿ 1. If ￿rm 2 does not
certify, for example, there will be no e⁄ective technology adoption because ￿rm 1￿ s technology
will be unchanged. To see that ecolabeling may increase emissions, let us consider two cases:
(a) ￿ > ￿ !1 and ￿ 2 [￿ !1;￿] and (b) ￿ ￿ ￿ !1 and ￿ 2 [￿ !1; ￿ !2].
Case (a): ￿ > ￿ !1 and ￿ 2 [￿ !1;￿]
Note that this corresponds to the case of no e⁄ective technology adoption. Without a
labeling program, consumers treat two goods identical and equally ecologically unfriendly.20
By the argument above, with labeling ￿rm 1 certi￿es whereas ￿rm 2 does not. Total equi-
librium emissions in these cases are given by
E
￿















label, n￿=1 = ￿ !1
￿









where A = ￿+c(￿ !2)￿2c(￿ !1), B = ￿+c(￿ !1)￿2c(￿ !2). To see the maximal impact of labeling,
assume that all consumers are altruistic, so we have ￿ ’ 1=2 and ￿ ’ 1. Manipulating these
20The main result of this section may not hold if I assume that, in the absence of the labeling program,
consumers consider both ￿rms￿products are neutral, so that the distributional parameter ￿ = E[1=(1 + ￿)]
does not enter the demand function. Under the alternative assumption, we would have E￿
no label = ￿ !1 (A=3)+
￿ !2 (B=3), instead. In this case, we can prove that binary environmental labeling always reduces total emission
relative to the status quo without labeling.
26expressions with ￿ = 1=2, we obtain E￿
no label > E￿
















where C = 2￿ ￿ c(￿ !1) ￿ c(￿ !2). Note that A < B because ￿A=3 (￿B=3) is the equilibrium
quantity for ￿rm 1 (￿rm 2), which has a higher (lower) production cost. Moreover, because
￿ > c(￿ !1) > c(￿ !2), we have C > B. Thus, the bracketed term in LHS is always smaller than
that in RHS. Moreover, because ￿ ’ 1, the bracketed terms on both sides of the inequality
are negative. This can be interpreted to mean that the equilibrium quantity for the certifying
￿rm (i.e. ￿rm 1) is higher with labeling than without labeling. The relationship reverses
for the non-certifying ￿rm. Thus, when the majority of consumers are altruistic, ecolabeling
yields an expected impact. However, given 0 < ￿ !1 < ￿ !2, we can certainly have a combination
of (￿ !1; ￿ !2) such that LHS is less than RHS.
Remark: This result is intuitive. When two products di⁄er by abatement technology and
one with low emissions is certi￿ed while the other with high emissions is not certi￿ed, the
consumer demand for the labeled good increases whereas that for the non-labeled good de-
creases. Duopolists choose quantities in response to this demand change. However, the
demand for the certi￿ed product may increase too much to the extent it outweighs the pos-
itive impact from the shift in demand. In general, we would expect that the total emissions
from the industry will be lower with the labeling program than without if and only if this
quantity impact (i.e. LHS of (9)) is smaller in magnitude than the relative abatement
e¢ ciency (i.e. ￿ !2=￿ !1). The above result says that such a condition is not always satis￿ed.
Remark: Note that this result obtains because in our model, the distribution of consumers
can give rise to the asymmetric impacts of labeling on demand for labeled and non-labeled
goods. In the vertical di⁄erentiation model, in contrast, each consumer buys a ￿xed number
of units from exactly one of the ￿rms. Thus, if the demand shifts from a dirtier ￿rm to a
cleaner ￿rm, the overall impact must always result in a net reduction in emissions. To see
27this, suppose that the duopolists￿abatement technologies are ￿ !1 < ￿ !2 (prior to the third-
party labeling) and that the labeling makes the ￿rms￿technologies perfectly observable.
Assuming that ￿ divesting￿from the current technologies is costly, the new technology levels
after introduction of labeling must be such that !j ￿ ￿ !j;j = 1;2. If the demand shift
occurs, it happens simply as the changes in the market share that must sum to zero. Let
x1 and x2 be the pre-labeling equilibrium quantities and d ￿ 0 the demand shift. Then, it
must follow that E￿
no label = ￿ !1x1 + ￿ !2x2 > !1(x1 ￿ d) + !2(x2 ￿ d) = E￿
label provided that
!j ￿ ￿ !j;j = 1;2. Thus, in the vertical di⁄erentiation model, emissions cannot increase with
the introduction of ecolabeling.
Case (b): ￿ ￿ ￿ !1 and ￿ 2 [￿ !1; ￿ !2]
In this case, e⁄ective technology adoption occurs because ￿rm 2 adopts a technology
that meets the standard. It is easy to see that total emissions will be minimized at ￿ = ￿ !1,
because n￿ = 2 for all ￿ ￿ ￿ !1 and total emissions when n￿ = 2 will be given by
E
￿
label, n￿=2 = ￿ !1
￿









which has a positive ￿rst derivative with respect to ￿ provided that c0 < 0 and 0 ￿ ￿ !1 ￿ ￿.
Now, let ￿ = ￿ !1 and compare E￿
no label with E￿
label, n￿=2. In this case, we can see that an
increase in the mass of the altruistic population (i.e. a decrease in ￿) negatively impact this
comparison. When ￿ ’ 1=2, we obtain E￿
no label > E￿
label, n￿=2 if and only if
￿ !2 (￿ + c(￿ !1) ￿ 2c(￿ !2)) > ￿ !1 (3￿ ￿ 2c(￿ !1) ￿ c(￿ !2)):
However, it is immediate to see that a set of primitives (￿;c; ￿ !1; ￿ !2) exists such that this
inequality does not hold. We thus "proved" by cases (a) and (b) the following:
Proposition 3. Suppose abatement technology endowments are heterogenous (i.e. ￿ !1 < ￿ !2).
With a discriminatory standard, ￿ !1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ !2, binary environmental labeling may not always
28reduce total emissions relative to the status quo. This is true even if a Subgame Perfect Nash
Equilibrium of the game is for both ￿rms to certify for all ￿ 2 [￿ !1; ￿ !2] and the standard is
chosen to lock in the best available abatement technology (i.e. to set ￿ = ￿ !1).
VI. Discussion
Ecolabeling has the potential to achieve signi￿cant emissions reductions and improve the
social welfare. This paper investigates the e⁄ects of binary ecolabeling on the strategic com-
petition of ￿rms in environmental technology and in the output market. Because consumers
can not directly observe the actual abatement e¢ ciency of the products under binary label-
ing, setting an appropriate technology standard for certi￿cation can have signi￿cant welfare
impacts.
The paper o⁄ers a set of negative results on binary ecolabeling along with important
policy implications. One should not, however, interpret these negative results to mean that
regulatory authorities must disregard the idea of binary labeling to help solve environmental
problems. On the contrary, these results are meant to guide ecolabeling policies on a large
class of environmental and resource problems. As demonstrated with a numerical example,
there are cases in which setting an appropriate standard per se can potentially achieve the
welfare level su¢ ciently close to the ￿rst-best level. Binary ecolabeling should be directed to
this class of environmental and resource problems, provided that no ￿rst-best policies (e.g.
taxes or permit markets) are readily available to tackle them due to, say, political inertia.
The paper also shows that arbitrary discriminatory labeling to favor environmentally
more advanced ￿rms may not only result in an ine¢ cient outcome but can also increase total
emissions relative to the status quo. This calls upon a question into the current ecolabeling
practice, which often uses an engineering approach to set technology standards. The paper
does not argue either for or against binary labels. Rather, it argues that, provided that the
binary scheme continues to be a popular mode for many ecolabeling initiatives worldwide,
attending to the economic impacts of setting particular technology standards for certi￿cation
29is critical.
The model presented in this paper can be extended in a number of important ways.
Previous studies have discussed the impact of taxes and subsidies when consumers are en-
vironmentally aware and ￿rms￿abatement technologies are perfectly observable. Unlike in
the previous studies (e.g. Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995; Bansal & Gangopadhyay, 2003;
Lombardini-Riipinen, 2005), neither a uniform ad valorem tax nor subsidy necessarily a⁄ects
￿rms￿technology adoption. Under binary labeling, ￿rms￿abatement technologies are unob-
servable to consumers and ￿rms have no incentive to invest more in abatement technologies
than required by the standard even when they have a larger pro￿t margin in the output
market. Because the uniform ad valorem tax (subsidy) decreases (increases) the equilibrium
quantities (and thereby the equilibrium pro￿ts) almost equally across all three cases in the
second stage (i.e. in the quantity competition), the Nash outcomes of the ￿rst-stage game
are essentially intact.
On the contrary, a discriminatory ad valorem tax/subsidy or an emission tax likely af-
fects ￿rms￿technology adoption because such a policy will change the relative pro￿tability
of certi￿cation. Via a slightly di⁄erent mechanism, a subsidy on abatement technology in-
vestments also facilitates technology adoption, and thereby, it may help achieve an outcome
su¢ ciently close to the ￿rst-best. When adopting an emission tax, however, one needs to
account for three disturbing factors: (1) partial internalization of pollution externality due
to consumer￿ s altruistic behavior; (2) the negative externality from oligopolistic competition
in the output market; and (3) the negative externality from ￿xed costs and oligopolistic com-
petition in technology adoption (Spence, 1976). All these factors jointly a⁄ect the e¢ cient
emission tax rate, and therefore, the tax rate that achieves the ￿rst best outcome may be
lower or higher than the marginal social cost of emissions. The paper did not consider these
issues in order to maintain its focus on the trade-o⁄ in setting the standard, leaving them
for future research.
This paper analyzed a static three-stage game describing the competing interests be-
30tween ￿rms and the labeling authority. Given the results presented, an interesting extension
of the model would be to investigate dynamic updating rules for technology standards in the
presence of endogenous technology innovation. The authority would like to update technol-
ogy standards as ￿rms￿technologies advance. On the one hand, the prospect for the future
update of the technological standards gives ￿rms incentives to slow down investments in
abatement technologies. On the other hand, ￿rms may be better o⁄ investing all at once
rather than in a chunky manner, in which case they may invest more than required in the
current period in expectation of the future update. Furthermore, ￿rms may prefer to invest
(and certify) to quickly reap the bene￿ts of higher demand for certi￿ed products before they
face tighter technology standards in the following periods. In the presence of stochastic
investment outcomes, ￿rms are also likely to engage in a ￿ patent race.￿ Firms￿incentives
to in￿ uence the standard-making process as well as heterogeneity of ￿rms￿e¢ ciencies in
technology innovation are also important in this context. Because these competing inter-
ests a⁄ect the speed of investments as well as the equilibrium number of certifying ￿rms in
each period, the labeling authority must face a more di¢ cult decision to set an appropriate
standard in each period as the industry technology advances over time. The analyses of this
type are also left for future research.
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Lemma 2. Suppose A1 and A2 hold. Then there exist ￿
12 and ￿
34 in the interior of [0; ￿ !]
such that (i) ￿
12 ￿ ￿ =) L12 (￿) ￿ 0 and (ii) ￿
34 ￿ ￿ =) L34 (￿) ￿ 0. These thresholds are
unique in [0; ￿ !].
Proof : We ￿rst establish that L12 (￿ !) > 0 and L34 (￿ !) > 0. Substituting k(￿ !) = 0 (by A2)
and B (￿ !) = 0 into the expressions in Table 2, we readily see that
L




34 (￿ !) = f(1 + 2=￿)
2 =(3 + 4=￿)
2 ￿ ￿=9gA(￿ !)
2 > 0;
for all combinations of ￿ 2 (1;1) and ￿ 2 (1=2;1). Now, from the expressions in Table 2
and using c(0) = ￿ and k (0) = K > 0, we have
L

















Moreover, L12 (￿) is continuous and increasing with the ￿rst derivative dL12=d￿ = d￿I
1=d￿ ￿
d￿II
1 =d￿ > 0, for all ￿ at which ￿I
1 (￿) > 0 and = 0 for ￿ with ￿I
1 (￿) = 0. Thus, by the
intermediate value theorem, there exists ￿




we must have dL12=d￿ > 0 at ￿
12. Suppose not. Then it must follow that ￿I
1 = ￿II
1 = 0,
which contradicts that ￿II
1 > 0 for all ￿ 2 [0; ￿ !]. Therefore, strict monotonicity at ￿
12
implies that ￿
12 is unique and that ￿
12 ￿ ￿ () L12 (￿) ￿ 0. Similarly, L34 (￿) is continuous,
di⁄erentiable, and strictly increasing with the ￿rst derivative dL34=d￿ = d￿III
1 =d￿ > 0, for
all ￿ at which ￿III
1 (￿) > 0 and = 0 for ￿ with ￿III
1 (￿) = 0. Thus, analogous arguments
establish the existence and uniqueness of ￿
34 with ￿
34 ￿ ￿ () L34 (￿) ￿ 0.
Q:E:D:
32Lemma 3. Suppose A1 holds. There exists unique ￿
24 in the interior of [0; ￿ !] such that
￿
24 ￿ ￿ () L24 (￿) ￿ 0 if and only if L24 (￿ !) < 0.

















We know that ￿II





= 0. If L24 (￿ !) = 0, ￿
24 = ￿ !. This establishes necessity. To show su¢ ciency,
suppose L24 (￿ !) < 0. Again by the intermediate value theorem, there exists ￿
24 2 (0; ￿ !)
such that L24 ￿
￿
24￿
= 0. Moreover, strict monotonicity of ￿II
1 implies that ￿
24 is unique and
￿
24 ￿ ￿ () L24 (￿) ￿ 0. Q:E:D:
Lemma 4. Let ￿ = (￿; ￿ !;c;￿) be a given set of primitives (except k). Suppose that A1






￿ [0; ￿ !].
Proof : The proof proceeds in two steps. In the ￿rst step, I show that provided that (￿;k)
satis￿es A1 and A2 with L24 (￿ !;￿) < 0, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for ￿
12 < ￿
14
is that L14 ￿
￿
24￿
< 0. In the second step, we shall see that given ￿, which satis￿es A1 and





1 is increasing, ￿II
1 decreasing, and ￿IV
1 constant under A1 and A2, the
uniqueness of ￿
12, combined with L24 (￿ !) < 0, implies that ￿
12 < ￿
14 if and only if ￿
24 < ￿
14.
Thus, we only need to show that under A1 and A2, ￿
24 < ￿




To show su¢ ciency, suppose L14 ￿
￿
24￿
< 0. Because L14 (￿ !) < 0, by the intermediate
value theorem, there exists ￿
14 2 (￿





14 and suppose by contradiction L14 ￿
￿
24￿
￿ 0. It then follows that by strict
monotonicity of ￿I
1, L14 (￿) ￿ 0 for all ￿ ￿ ￿






and if L14 ￿
￿
24￿
> 0, we have ￿
14 < ￿
24. Thus, we obtain ￿
14 ￿ ￿
24, a contradiction.
33Now it remains to show the existence of an investment function that satis￿es A2 and
yields the property L14 ￿
￿
24￿
< 0. In Lemma 3, we have seen that ￿
24 exists and unique
given L24 (￿ !) < 0. Recall that we did not need A2 for this result. For a given set of



















￿ " < 0. Then de￿ne k (￿) =
K ￿ "￿=(￿ ! ￿ ￿
24 (￿)) where K = "￿ !=(￿ ! ￿ ￿






Proof of Lemma 5.
By Lemma 4, we can always ￿nd k such that ￿
12 < ￿
14 given ￿ with L24 (￿ !;￿) < 0. It





supports SPNE in which both enter. There are two
generic cases: (i) ￿
34 ￿ ￿































supports two distinct SPNEs: one
in which both enter and the other in which none enters. Thus, it still supports (ec;ec) with
￿IV
1 > ￿I





14. For such ￿




Proof of Proposition 2.
(i) Let us ￿rst show that ￿
12 (￿;k0) ￿ ￿
12 (￿;k1) and ￿
34 (￿;k0) ￿ ￿
34 (￿;k1). Suppose
by contradiction that ￿
12 (￿;k0) > ￿
12 (￿;k1). Let ~ ￿I
1 (￿) ￿ ￿I
1 (￿) + k (￿). We know that
d~ ￿I
1=d￿￿d￿II
1 =d￿ > 0. Thus, ￿
12 (￿;k0) > ￿












































































. However, because k0
0 < 0 by A2
34and ￿
12 (￿;k0) > ￿











Analogous arguments establish ￿
34 (￿;k0) ￿ ￿
34 (￿;k1).
(ii) To show ￿
12 (￿;￿0) < ￿




(￿￿2)(5 + 4=￿)[A(￿) + 2B (￿)]
(3 + 4=￿)
3 < 0:









= 0, combined with @L12=@￿ > 0, must imply ￿






(4￿￿2)XIII (￿)[A(￿) + 2B (￿)]
(3 + 4=￿)







Hence, we have L34 (￿;￿0) > L34 (￿;￿1) for each ￿, which implies ￿
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